I
Imperialism refers to relations between states and peoples in which one state is able to effectively impose, constrain, dominate and exploit others in ways that affect their most important interests. This can occur either directly or indirectly, formally or informally. Of course it is never total and there is always room to manoeuvre on the part of those subject to these relations of power. However, that room is always seriously constrained. Imperial law can be defined in terms of its inherently hierarchical structure: one state is sovereign and its will trumps other legal and normative systems. The independence of other legal orders is therefore, by definition, contingent and shifting, depending on the interests of the imperial power.
In the fields of political theory and public law, the structure of imperialism is associated above all with the period of formal Western imperialism stretching from the 16 th century (at least) until the mid to late 20 th century and the various movements and processes of decolonisation. However, it has also been associated with developments since decolonisation, and especially the rise of the United States and the new global political, legal and economic order formed in its wake. This 'new imperialism' is associated with the US and its various allies working with (and at times against) an informal league of cooperating and competing sovereign states and transnational corporations, as well as a complex of global institutions such as the IMF and WB, and transnational legal regimes such as GATT. There remains considerable debate about the extent to which various responses to this form of imperialismamong them, the discourse of 'moral cosmopolitanism', the rise of institutions of 'global governance', the 'constitutionalization' of human rights, the emergence of the EU etc. -escape or remain entangled within imperial relations. Here is one formulation of this kind of concern:
'[cosmopolitan discourse] is abstract and utopian in the worst sense…the sovereignty-based model of international law appears to be ceding not to cosmopolitan justice but to an imperial project of dominance and indirect control of key "peripheries". The world's sole superpower makes good use of cosmopolitan discourse in its efforts to marginalize international institutions and undermine international law, especially law restraining the use of force and the legal principles of non-intervention and self-determination. What we face is not a simple effort to evade international law by a powerful actor, but rather a serious bid to reorient it in an imperial direction -under the heading of "global right". The form of justice I am concerned with here is distributive or social justice. The two notions are not identical, though in the modern era they often become interchangeable. The former emerges -at least as we understand it today-only really from the 18 th C onwards, despite discussions of distributive justice from at least Aristotle onwards.
2 For Aristotle, justice was both a general and particular virtue (NE 1129b 29-30; 1130a14). As a particular virtue it referred to a distribution of goods and to each receiving their due, where 'due' was correlated to the particular excellences people had, especially in relation to their political status. Social justice comes much later, appearing really only in the political discourse of the late 19 th C. However, modern distributive justice and social justice share certain conceptual features and preconditions. It might be worth stating some of them here (somewhat schematically):
1. Each individual possess a good that deserves respect and each is due certain things (rights, resources, protections, opportunities) in order to pursue that good (as a matter of right and not charity); 2. There is a bounded community of some kind within which an individual's share (however defined) can be defined in relation to the shares held by others in that community, and part of that share includes certain material goods which are everyone's due. [This can obviously be in tension with (1) if the relevant community is less than humanity itself: the tension is thus between what every person is due and what each citizen is due]; 3. There is an identifiable institutional structure to which principles or standards of justice can be applied and which can be shaped in light of those standards (Miller thinks this means we need developments in social science to help us track the impact of institutional changes on individual's life chances etc. That is, it must be conceived as technically possible to relieve poverty before doing so is considered to be a legitimate moral claim by the poor on the community.); 3 4. There must be some agency (or agencies) capable of undertaking the distribution and promoting social justice overall [hence tendency to explain [2] in terms of the territorial state].
The 'social' in social justice therefore refers to the application of the principle to society and its institutions as a whole, and not only to individual behaviour. It also includes an assumption about the equality of individuals, although crucially one that is ambiguous between 'persons' and 'citizens'. John Rawls, famously, defines justice in terms of fairness. The role of principles of justice for him is to specify the 'fair terms of social cooperation'. They are meant to specify the basic rights and duties to be assigned by the main social and political institutions (the 'basic structure'), and they regulate the division of benefits arising from social cooperation and allot the burdens necessary to sustain it. 4 The challenge of global or international justice is the extension of this framework from the domestic to the global sphere. The challenge has been to reconcile a deep commitment on the part of liberal egalitarianism to moral egalitarianism -that everyone is deserving of equal concern and respect, regardless of their social, cultural, (6:392). 16 It's one thing to act out of fear, or to be constrained by others to act as a means to an end, but it's another thing to set an end for oneself -to act genuinely freely. The appeal to dignity here isn't so much an appeal to a principle of action as it is to an attitude that we should take up towards others. 17 Elsewhere in the Groundwork Kant expresses it another way: 'I say that the human being and in general every rational being exists as en end in itself, not merely as a means to be used by this or that will at its discretion' (4:428). Appealing to the fundamental dignity of human beings is now a familiar way in which we talk about the rights. In fact, it's written into Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 18 But what follows from it?
Let us take a step backward before answering this question directly. Kant marks both the end of the kind of contractarianism we find beginning with Grotius and Locke, and yet also a new chapter in its development. Like his seventeenth century predecessors, he thinks there is a valid, universally binding principle of right, which is accessible to us and against which human action and human social and political orders can and should be judged. But unlike the natural lawyers, he doesn't appeal to any kind of empirical conditions for its justification -such as prudential self-interest or happiness -nor to any kind of traditional metaphysical teleology. Instead, he appeals to pure practical reason. We can derive our moral duties from reason. As moral agents, at least, we are subject to the laws of reason alone, not those of theology, or 16 Another way to express this idea is to say Kant conceives of human beings as reason-responsive beings; that we bind ourselves to norms and act on the basis of reasons, and think of ourselves as free just insofar as we do. It follows that we ought to treat others as reason-responsive too, and thus capable of binding themselves according to norms that they legislative for themselves. In the Groundwork, Kant divides ethics into two parts: the metaphysics of morals consisting in principles valid a priori for every human being, and practical anthropology, an empirical study of human nature to which the principles are applied It is also close to the difference Rousseau points out as between 'amour de soi' and 'amour propre' -between self-regard and pride -in the Discourse on Inequality. 21 In his 'Idea for a Universal History' (1784), Kant argues that human nature develops in history through competitiveness; through our desire 'for honour, power or property' that drives us to seek 'status' among our fellows 'whom he cannot bear yet cannot bear to leave' (8:21)). In fact, it is through social antagonism and conflict that our rational capacities can develop to the point where we can recognize a moral law 19 On the historical background and emergence of Kant's moral philosophy see Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy (Cambridge, CUP, 1998 what we ought to do (and not do)? In order to be consistent with our autonomy, the moral law must be formal, or a priori. Hence Kant's account of moral duties flowing from the 'categorical imperative'. To say that an imperative -a principle for actionis 'categorical' is simply to say that its bindingness does not depend on the pursuit of some end set independently of it. I don't refrain from lying because I think by doing so I will go to heaven, or even for the sake of social cooperation. Rather, the bindingness of the norm is unconditional. 23 I don't lie because that is what morality requires. Kant expresses this idea initially in the form of the 'formula of the universal law': 'Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it becomes a universal law' (4:442). In other words, obey only universal laws; that is, practical principles applying to all rational beings.
But this is only the beginning. Kant provides two further formulas, one that draws our attention to those affected by our actions, and another from the perspective of our being a member of a community that so wills. The second formula states: 'So act that you use humanity whether in your own person or that of another, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means' (4:429). This says that the ends of others, as long as they are morally permissible, set limits to our own and that we must respect them. In doing so we are respecting others as 'ends in themselves', that is, not using them as 'things' or coercing them for our own purposes. This is a good way of making sense of Kant's appeal to the inherent dignity of 'humanity' with which we began above. The duties that the moral law will prescribe will be -just given their form -coordinate with the rights of others (or at least, so he claims). The third is the 'formula of autonomy': 'the idea of the will of every rational being as a will giving universal law (4:431), and that 'all maxims from one's own lawgiving are to harmonize with a possible kingdom of ends' (4:436). This third formula instructs us to think of ourselves as members of a society of beings whose permissible ends are respected in the right way. We should act to help bring about such a community of harmonized ends.
None of these formulae are intended as moral algorithms that tell us how to act in each and every situation, whatever the context. 24 But put together, they add up to a powerful set of rules or norms against which to test our actual or intended behaviour.
In particular, they act as a set of constraints on our tendency to excuse ourselves from the demands of reason we expect of others. And they structure how we should think about our rights as well as the rights of others. So we don't only have an innate right to our person, which is crucial to our setting and pursuing any kind of end in the first place, but also rights to usable things and to establish various kinds of rational relations. But if we are all equally free, then how can we interact in ways that don't compromise our independence? Since we are all fundamentally free and equal, nobody should have the power to interfere with or control how I set my purposes, except insofar as it's required to preserve the freedom of others. This is private right: the right to make something external one's own. Kant relates it to three categories -property, contract (ie. our capacity to transfer our rights) and status (ie. asymmetrical but rightful relations with others, eg.
masters/servants; parents/children; teachers/students). 29 Let us examine these ideas more closely, since they allow us to grasp Kant's conception of right more fully. However, because we share the limited space of the globe, and live unavoidably side-by-side, we can't help but affect each other's actions (6:262). This is a crucial point, what I referred to as the 'fact of proximity'. The problem is also highlighted in the antinomy (6:246). 30 Given my claim to an innate right to freedom, I must be able to claim external objects of my choice as rightfully mine. But by acquiring things I violate the equally valid claim to freedom of everyone else, and so can't be rightful.
How can both be true, as Kant suggests they are (6: 255)? Pure practical reason tells 30 The postulate says: 'It is possible for me to have an external object of my choice as mine, that is, a maxim by which, if it were to become a law, an object of choice would in itself (objectively) have to belong to no one (res nullius), is contrary to Right'. (6: 246) The problem seems to be that neither a general permission nor a general prohibition satisfies the universal principle of right (at 6: 231). For an interesting discussion of one way of dissolving the antinomy see Brandt in Hoffe (1995).
us how we should interact as rational wills: exercise your freedom in a way compatible with the freedom of all. But reason also tell us, given the fact that the world is finite, that some of our actions will unavoidably limit what others would otherwise be able to do. The principle of right provides a (supposedly) formal principle for resolving those conflicts, but one informed by certain empirical facts as well. Thus, even if it is the case that I can institute rational relations with others to secure non-physical ownership, I can't do so on the basis of my judgement alone as to what should be the case. My possessing something will have consequences for your freedom. As Kant puts it, 'a unilateral will cannot serve as a coercive law for everyone with regard to possession that is external and therefore contingent, since that would infringe upon freedom in accordance with universal laws' (6:256). This means we are necessarily subject to the principle of right, to justice. What is wrong with remaining in the state of nature then is that it is a state of indeterminacy about the boundary between mine and thine. 31 We know we have to respect each other's freedom and property, but we need a mechanism for determining what that actually entails. We can't fulfil our duty to 'harm no one' (see (2) above) without the determinacy provided by a civil order. And we can't, in principle, establish unilaterally intelligible possession that is a necessary aspect of the exercise of our freedom in a finite world we share with other agents. Unilateral judgement is incompatible with the innate rights of humanity. This is what Kant means by the 'a priori idea of a general and united will' (6:258). It's not just that we're likely to disagree over property (contra Locke), but that we must already be in the right relationship for my act to have significance for you. 32 I need to acquire means for my purposes, but your freedom must be respected in the process (6:250-1; 6:312). These two requirements can only be satisfied in a 'rightful' condition (the same holds true for contractual and 'status' relations). The idea of provisional right points to two interesting lines of thought in Kant's political theory. First, that although the moral ideal of rational politics is impossible to realize on earth, we are still obligated to try and achieve it. Justice is impossible and yet obligatory. 35 Thus, just as our property rights are not optimally realized in something less than an ideal state, so too our autonomy in general, and yet the idea of an original contract grounding the rule of law still obligates us. And since states exist in relation to each other in a state of nature (lacking a universal omnilateral will between them), the peaceful condition between them is only ever provisional until a 33 If I use your property without your permission, or I damage it and thus disable you from using it for your purposes, I have coerced you. If I violate the terms of our contract then I coerce you in the sense of depriving you of the means you were entitled to under the terms of our agreement. If I take advantage of you as your teacher or parent then I also coerce you by using you for my purposes, as opposed to respecting you as an end in yourself. All of these are instances of coercion that are inconsistent with any kind of reciprocal limits on freedom. Coercion that hinders these forms of coercion is consistent with freedom as non-dependence. 34 Ellis has made an interesting case for putting the idea of provisional right at the heart of Kant's political philosophy; see Kant' To remain in a state of nature, then, is to subject oneself to the potential interference of others, which is to live in a way incompatible with one's autonomy (6:
255-6). It follows from our being free that subject to the right kind of coercive authority is not only permissible but required. Doing so is the only way to make our freedom mutually compatible. Thus we have a duty to enter into the civil condition The enforcement of rights, in other words, has a distinctly public character in Kant's political theory. It's not just that the private enforcement of rights is inconvenient or likely to lead to conflict (as both Hobbes and Locke suggest) and therefore prudentially warranted, but that it is fundamentally incompatible with our status as free and equal. Even if it never did lead to conflict, private enforcement is wrong; the only imposition of force compatible with our freedom is one that issues from an 'omnilateral' as opposed to unilateral will. The only rights I can have are those compatible with a system of rights in which your rights are guaranteed as well, including their mutual enforcement.
But Kant also says we have a duty to establish not just any common authority, but rather a republican political order, one compatible with our innate rights.
Formally he defines it as 'the political principle of separation of the executive power (the government) from the legislative power' (8:352, 354). But it is also a regime in which the sovereign will of the people is represented to the ruling power, who are then charged with implementing it. Kant is often confusing here, because he seems to think that monarchy is, in fact, much more conducive to republican rule than either democracy or aristocracy (8:352-3). 39 Despotism has to do with the corruption of the general will, not a particular form of government. It is the 'high-handed management of the state by laws the regent has himself given, inasmuch as he handles the public will as his private will' (8:352).
Our innate rights, thinks Kant, helps explain the kind of powers the state has, as well as the nature of our obedience to it. For one thing, the justification has to be formal, in order to be universal. Free persons (ideally conceived), concerned to protect their freedom, can only ever agree (ideally, not actually) to enter a civil 39 In fact, Kant thinks democracy is necessarily a despotism: see 8:352-3.
condition in which their freedom is secure. 40 So a state is never justified in seeking to promote the happiness of its citizens, only their freedom (8:290-1). Nor is a state justified in appropriating the property of its citizens to help meet the needs of landless or poorer citizens. As we've seen, as a matter of private right, no one can be made to serve as the means for another, just as no one has a right to means that aren't already their own. As a matter of public right, the state isn't justified in using me as a means for promoting social justice or substantive equality, even if I can afford it and others are in genuine need. 41 However, the state still needs enough authority to make the division between 'mine and thine' determinate and rightful, that is, to 'hinder the hindrances' to our freedom, and this ends up justifying considerable state power.
VI
The problem with Kant's account, however, is the extent to which it is dependent on a deeply implausible and unattractive metaphysical anthropology. The conception of ideal rational beings at the heart of his account -independent of being determined by any kind of sensible impulse -has attracted criticism ever since the argument was first made. Kant's work is replete with indications, however, that he is not so naïve about politics, and moreover sees a crucial role for freely willed human action in relation to it, but it's not clear how much weight these remarks bear on his wider 40 Ideal rational beings -independent of being determined by any kind of sensible impulse -in willing the law obey it, and would obey the laws of a just state as naturally as the laws of gravity. But human beings are not those kinds of agents. For a provocative discussion of what he calls 'the metaphysical anthropology of homo duplex' in Kant's Metaphysics of Morals, see Hunter, Rival Enlightenments, pp. 320-337. 41 We have a duty of charity towards the poor, but it's an imperfect duty; one with a wide degree of latitude as to how we are supposed to discharge it. Recall also that to be dependent on the charity or generosity of another is to lack autonomy in the strong sense that Kant associates with our being free moral agents. Of course, many of us might come to lack enough resources to pursue our own ends through no fault of our own because of the consequences of a series of otherwise rightful private transactions. For this reason Kant thinks the state does have the right to tax the rich to support the poor, but only as a means of protecting them against falling into this kind of 'no-fault' dependence (see 6: 233). This kind of dependency is inconsistent with the idea of people sharing a genuinely united will, which is supposed to make the exercise of political and legal power consistent with our fundamental freedom and equality.
argument about the relation between morality and politics. One of the most notorious examples can be found in Perpetual Peace:
The problem of setting up a state…is solvable even for a people of devils (if only they have understanding). It is this: A set of rational beings who on the whole need for their preservation universal laws from which each is however secretly inclined to exempt himself is to be organized and their constitution arranged so that their private attitudes, though opposed, nevertheless check one another in such a way that these beings behave in public as if they had no such evil attitudes (8: 366).
'Mere' legal order is thus possible through natural incentives (as Hobbes showed).
But Kant also clearly indicates (here and elsewhere) that it's not enough (can only ever be provisional), and that progress through enlightenment includes the transition from mere legal order to a civil society in which one's autonomy was genuinely 
42
A more 'political' reading of Kant would be that there is some independent value to the notion of external freedom such that each of us has an enlightened interest in establishing a political and legal order in which our lives are determined by our own choices, rather than those coercively imposed by others. 43 To borrow terminology from Rawls, it would be that the appeal to external freedom in the precisely, the claim would be that even it's true that Kant sees his doctrine of Recht as the only one that fits his moral philosophy, it doesn't follow that Recht cannot stand without that moral philosophy. In other words, even if you can show that R follows from M, it doesn't follow that if you accept R, you must necessarily accept M.
There are deep challenges to such a reading, however. Ian Hunter, for example, has argued that we need to see Kant's entire philosophical approach as an historically specific intellectual or spiritual exercise aimed at forming the kind of self that the philosopher must become if he is to accede to the principle of right as a metaphysical truth. Kant is engaged, in other words, not in the philosophical project of justifying metaphysical truth, but 'the grooming of the intellectual deportment required to accede to such truth'. 45 In short, Kant's metaphysics needs to be treated as a contingent historical form, the product of a specific regional set of intellectual practices and institutions, as opposed to a valid claim about the structure of human understanding.
We must be careful to avoid something like the genetic fallacy here. Unveiling the historical specificity of an argument says nothing, in itself, about its ultimate validity.
It denaturalises the concept and renders it more contingent, but it doesn't in itself refute it or even suggest we should abandon it. Contingency does not entail arbitrariness. It may well refute certain beliefs we have about the concept or theory, but it may not. A genealogy of a concept or theory can be debunking, but also vindicatory. 46 It will depend on how that genealogy sits within the self-understanding of the tradition or community of interpreters involved, or for whom the argument or concept has significance. What historical reflection can do is debunk the seeming obviousness of our assumptions about the problem to hand. In doing so it can generate Recall Rawls's distinction between 'freestanding' and 'comprehensive' doctrines.
The problem with comprehensive doctrines -and for Rawls, this indeed includes Kant's moral and political doctrines -is that they are socially divisive, and unable to gain the reasoned assent of individuals understood as free and equal. If a conception of social justice depends on the state extracting resources from individuals in order for them to be redistributed, and if that conception is grounded in a 'comprehensive' view, then the danger is that state power will be required to maintain that shared understanding (through public education etc.) and it will be seen as alien or illegitimate in the eyes of those with different comprehensive views. Since the presence of a diversity of comprehensive views is inevitable in most modern societies, such a doctrine could only be sustained through state 'oppression' (1993: 37).
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The liberal reading of Kant depends on the plausibility of an interpretation of the Rechtslehre as 'free-standing' in some way, given the independent value of something like external freedom understood as independence or 'non-domination'. sharing a territory have a duty to 'come to terms with one another'. 52 In order to come to terms with each other, one's engagement with one's own cultural norms has to be of certain kind; not as if they were 'brute aspects of one's identity', but as a 'standard which does some normative work in the life of one's community'. They must be based on practices of reason-giving, in other words, and thus defeasible and 50 For this see Ellis, Kant's Politics: Provision Theory for an Uncertain World, especially chps 2-3. Ellis tries to separate Kant's strong teleological argument from a weaker version that is more compatible with his political theory. The basic problem is how to bridge the gap between nature and freedom: a strong teleological story (such as Kant seems to present in 'Universal History') provides one solution, but Ellis claims Kant actually offers a distinctively 'political' solution too. Politics itself is the dynamic relation between the two domains. Thus Kant's 'best response' to the problem teleology presents to his political argument is the priority (Ellis argues) he accords to the transition towards the just state over ideals of perfection-that is, progress through freely willed human action, the application of 'freedom to practice' (see pp. Waldron (1994) . The Humean approach is concerned with limiting the potential for social conflict and facilitating social interaction. Once a settled pattern of possession has emerged, we draw a line and say, roughly, 'property entitlements start from here', to avoid constant destabilizing arguments about origins etc. The Rousseauian approach, on the other than, seeks not only stability but also on ensuring that each person's moral interests are protected as well. The distribution of property rights is thus subject to the general will and broad principles of justice that reflect each person's status as an equal (willing) member of that society. In both cases, historical entitlements appear to have extremely limited purchase on the distribution of property rights.
into that argument here. But the challenge that concepts like 'indigenous rights' or 'native title' presents to a Kantian or neo-Kantian cosmopolitanism presents an opportunity to test the limits of these approaches.
It's clear that indigenous peoples' claims do cast various aspects of the legitimacy of existing states' claim to exclusive jurisdiction over territory into question. But at the same time, it's also clear that these claims are usually not for separate state-hood.
As a result, they offer an interesting opportunity to reflect on what forms of jurisdiction over territory might be compatible with the cosmopolitan approaches outlined above, and yet also rooted in the particular forms of life and world-views.
Although claims about 'indigeneity' do indeed raise difficult issues from the perspective of cosmopolitan justice, I don't think they necessarily have the unpalatable consequences many assume they do.
Kant, as we know, was indeed a fierce and careful critic of the Grotian moral framework that supplied a powerful justification for early modern imperialism. In a remarkable set of passages in his Rechstlehre, Kant considers some of the issues raised by different peoples living near each other and their different understandings of property. In particular, he appears sensitive to the differences and conflicts between agrarian and nomadic peoples. He asks: 'In order to acquire land is it necessary to develop it (build on it, cultivate it, drain it and so on)? No. (6: 265)'. For Kant, as we saw above, intent to occupy a piece of land or claim an object exclusively and to bring it under one's will, is the basis of ownership. Original acquisition can occur, but is only provisional: for genuine ownership to exist, a community must recognize the owner's intention to control the land or object. Individual title doesn't derive from use, but from the intention to exclude others, and to have that right, it is necessary to belong to a community in which one can take up such a right in the first place. Yes, but not through force: 'only by contract, and indeed by a contract that does not 56 Note that since Kant believed that human beings originally held the world in common, even with the establishment of legitimate states, no one has absolute authority over their territory since each 'stand in a community of possible physical interaction (commercium)' with others, and each has 'a right to make this attempt' without being treated as an enemy (6:352). Kant accepts that states can legitimately possess and settle 'colonies' or 'provinces' (6:337) -a 'secondary house' or 'daughter state' (6:348) -but that these 'hybrid states' (civitas hybrida) have their own constitution, legislation, and land (albeit always subject to the executive authority of the 'mother state', see 6:348), which migrants and visitors alike have to respect (see 6:338, 8:358). The right to establish a community with others via settlement, as opposed to interacting with them in various ways, requires a specific contract, even if the lands in question seems under-inhabited (6:353). 57 6:266, see also 6:353, 8:358-9. The discussion in Section 15 is not without ambiguity, however: 'The indeterminacy, with respect to quantity as well as quality, of the external object that can be acquired makes this problem (of the sole, original external acquisition) the hardest of all to solve'. take advantage of the ignorance of those inhabitants with respect to ceding their lands' (6:353). Moreover, according to the 3 rd Definitive Principle, although there was a right to hospitality -that is, a claim on the part of individuals to temporary residency across borders (and a correlative duty on the part of states and others to allow it) -this right could not be used as a pretence for aggression or war.
One reason why Kant strikes such a different note in theorizing about property and territory in these contexts is his rejection of the claim that indigenous and other non-European peoples exist in a state of nature. 58 Many of these peoples will end up in European civil societies, mostly through force, although some by choice, however there is no suggestion that they are obliged to enter civil society, or that 'nature' entails that they will. 59 But as much as hunting and pastoralist peoples represent genuine social groups they are not genuine political or civil societies. This explains why they aren't under the same kind of moral obligation -as others are -to enter into properly civil relations and create a Rechstaat.
Sankar Muthu claims that Kant's insistence that all 'non-civil' beings are under a duty to enter into civil relations with one another can be reconciled with his critique of European imperialism, because 'the problems that the state is created for…are those of settled [agrarian] peoples', not people in general. 60 To be 'non-civil' and nonagrarian is not necessarily to be living in a state of nature and thus under a duty to create a coercive public power. Kant seemed to think that the lack of settled property meant that the kind of social relations that existed in these non-sedentary societies were much more fluid and less formal than in more settled, agriculturalist societies. 'institutional' cosmopolitanism. 66 The three principles alluded to in the previous sentence amount to a form of moral cosmopolitanism. Institutional cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, entails a commitment to certain global political institutions. So one could be a moral cosmopolitan without being thereby an institutional cosmopolitan.
The claim would be that moral cosmopolitanism is not committed to 'any specific empirical or explanatory claims about what forces shape the global realm'. choices) -on their life prospects is practice-independent in this sense. 70 The appeal is to moral values or facts about human beings alone, nothing else. The institutions and practices to which they are meant to apply play not role in the content, scope and justification of the principles. Practice-dependent theorists, on the other hand, think that our living under certain institutions, or our sharing specific kinds of practice mediated relations, puts us into a special relationship with each other that should have bearing on the nature of justice. It's the network of relationships that matters, since these relationships affect the way participants interact and thus shapes our conceptualization of appropriate principles of justice, as well as the reasons we have for accepting (or rejecting) any particular set of principles. A practice-dependent theorist is committed, therefore, to saying a conception of justice depends on an interpretation of actually existing institutional systems: the content, scope and justification of the conception will be determined by the role it's meant to play given those systems. 71 This would allow for principles of justice with less than global scope, though importantly it wouldn't entail that to be the case: there may well be principles of justice that emerge from practice or institution-mediated relations that are global in nature. In fact, I think this is very likely to be the case. We might want to call this a form of non-cosmopolitan universalism.
The differences between cosmopolitan global justice and non-cosmopolitan moral worth in the international sphere. And that if moral obligations stem from this claim, then they necessarily extend across borders and autonomous political communities have either no independent value, or only derivative value (they are justified to the extent they help realize global distributive justice). The suggestion here is that we can reject the second inference without giving up on some plausible interpretation of the first. Doing so is among the first steps towards a nonimperialistic doctrine of universal right.
